

CHALLENGING RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY: THE EMERGENCE OF SALAFI USTADHS IN INDONESIA

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A. Introduction

As charismatic leaders, the role of religious leaders (*kyai*, ‘*ulama*, and *muballigh*) in Muslim community is central. Their charisma stems from their deep knowledge of religion and good conduct. Consequently, they are the persons whom the people obey, listen to their advice, and imitate their conduct. Although their expertise is religion, their role in community expands beyond this expertise. People usually come to them for a number of purposes, ranging from family matters to social ones, from business affairs to politics. The government also benefits from them by asking their support for the government’s program. Their support takes several forms, such as issuing the fatwa and direct involvement in the program. On the other hand, the *kyais* and ‘*ulama* also benefit from the government. They receive large amount of money from the government to support their activities, such as the development of their *madrasahs* and *pesantrens*.

Since the last decade of the twentieth century, Indonesia has witnessed the emergence of Salafi movement. Supported by the same global movement, this movement has produced Salafi leaders, well-known as *ustāds*. They graduated from the Salafi education institutions in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Some of them are alumni of the Saudi-sponsored higher education, LIPIA (Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies) in Jakarta. In addition to their activities in teaching the students in their *pesantrens*, these *ustāds* actively hold religious teaching in public mosques, offices, or private houses. Their religious gatherings have attracted the following, and thus they become new religious leaders, religious elite, who challenge the existing religious authorities: *kyais*, ‘*ulama*, and religious leaders of mass organizations. The challenge of this group has been consciously sensed by the leaders of mass Muslim organizations, because of the conversion of some of their activists. Community responses to Salafi movement differ, ranging from verbal to violent action. This article discusses how this new religious elite emerges and challenges the existing religious leaders.

views that the position of ‘ulama is higher than that of kyai. This evaluation is based on a kyai’s acknowledgment whom he interviewed. Although van Bruinessen regarded him an ‘ulama, the kyai felt that he had not reached the level of ‘ulama; he was still in the level of kyai.⁵⁶

In practice, the title kyai is also given to the chairperson of mass Muslim organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In the NU community, some leading figures such as Muchith Muzadi, are called kyai although they do not head the pesantren. A similar tradition occurs in Muhammadiyah. Since its foundation in 1912, the chairpersons of Muhammadiyah were called kyai. To give example, Abdul Razak Fachruddin (chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1971 to 1985), and his successor, Azhar Basyir (chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1995 to 1998) are called kyai even though they did not lead the pesantren. This title, however, ended with Azhar Basyir. After Basyir, Muhammadiyah was led by Muslim intellectuals: Amien Rais (from 1995 to 1998), Syafi’i Maarif (from 1998 to 2005), and Sirojuddin Syamsuddin (from 2005 to date). Rather than a representation of traditional kyais, these leaders are Muslim scholars who graduated from American universities in social sciences; Rais graduated in political sciences of the University of Chicago, Maarif graduated in history of Political Islam of the University of Chicago, while Syamsudin graduated in political Islam of University of California at Los Angeles.⁵⁷ They indeed hold good understanding of religion, because they went to Islamic education institution before their study abroad. Din Syamsuddin, for example, went to famous modern pesantren, Darussalam, Gontor, East Java. Moreover, he graduated in comparative study of religions, at the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN, now UIN) Jakarta. Thus, since the last decade, Muhammadiyah has been led by Muslim intellectuals, or ‘ulama in a broader sense.

Besides kyai and ‘ulama, the term *ustād* and *muballigh* are commonplace to call a man of religion. The term *ustād* connotes the teacher of religious knowledge. The teachers of pesantren, regardless their subjects taught, are called *ustād* by santris and community nearby. In practice, a person who frequently delivers religious lesson in mosques is also called *ustād*. The community often called this type of religious man as *muballigh* (preacher). In addition to religious lessons taking place in mosques, offices, and houses, *ustāds* and *muballigh* often deliver Friday sermons. In many cases, *ustāds* and *muballighs* get salaries from this activity, and even some professional *ustads* and *muballighs* earn money from this activity. Concerning these titles, it is worth to mention

⁵⁶ Martin van Bruinessen, *Rakyat Kecil, Islam dan Politik*, Yogyakarta: Benteng Budaya, 1998, pp. 167-168.

⁵⁷ On brief account of these Muhammadiyah leaders, on Amien Rais, see, <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-167-det-prof-dr-h-amien-rais.html>; on Syafii Maarif, see, <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-168-det-prof-dr-ahmad-safii-maarif.html>, and on Sirojuddin Syamsuddin, see, <http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/content-169-det-prof-dr-h-m-din-syamsuddin.html>, accessed on January 2, 2012.

The case of *mubāḥatha* shows how Salafis challenging religious authorities of Persatuan Islam (Persis), a purist and reformist organization. The *mubāḥatha* entitled “Mengungkap Gerakan Salafy di Indonesia [Discovering Salafī Movement in Indonesia]” was conducted on 27 March 2007 in Bandung, West Java. The initiative of this dialog emerged from the head of Persis, West Java region. It was attended by prominent figures of Persis, including Siddiq Amien (chairman), Aceng Zakaria (the then head of Pesantren Persis in Garut, West Java), Usman Sholehuddin, head of Dewan Hisbah Persis, and Maman Abdurrahman. In addition to these leading figures of persis, the forum was also attended by delegations of Persis of all districts in West Java. The other party, the Salafis, is represented by Abdul Hakim Abdat (Jakarta) and Abu Qatadah (director of pesantren Ihyaus Sunnah, Tasikmalaya, West Java). Other Salafi figures, such as Tonari (Cirebon), Yunus Anis and Ayip Saefuddin were also present. During the discussion and dialog, Salafis and Persis discussed arguments and examined the *dalīl* of the necessity of following the Salaf manhaj.

The discussion was started by a welcoming speech of committee, and a brief speech of the head of Persis, West Java region. Following these speeches, Siddiq Amien, as a keynote speaker, presented his article on “Fenomena Gerakan Dakwah Salafy di Indonesia dan Menimbang Argumentasi Manhaj al-Salaf al-Saleh sebagai Dasar Ketiga sesudah al-Qur’an dan al-Sunnah” [Phenomenon of Salafī Da’wa Movement in Indonesia and Examination of arguments of Salaf Manhaj as the Third Source after the Qur’an and Sunna]. In his presentation, Amien highlighted some essential aspects Salafī movement in the country. In the first part of his presentation, he discussed the definition of Salafism. On this issue, he elaborated the meaning of “Salaf” and its derivatives. He explained that “Salaf” literally means “the predecessor”, and the “Salaf al-Salih” denotes the first three generations of Muslims, consisting of the Companions, the Followers, and the Followers of Followers. Meanwhile, Salafī connotes a person who follows the path of Salaf. In this point, Amien, as a representative of Persis, did not differ from the Salafīs in defining Salafism. Amien then complemented his presentation with his observation on the rise of Salafis movements in Indonesia. For him, the Salafī doctrines had inspired some religious movements in the country. The Wahhabi movement inspired the Paderi movement in Minangkabau, West Sumatera, in the 19th century. In the 20th century, Salafī ideas influenced the birth of a number of reformist religious movements: the Jami’at Khayr in 1905 in Jakarta, al-Irsyad in 1913 in Jakarta, Muhammadiyah in 1912 in Yogyakarta, and Persatuan Islam in 1923 in Bandung. With a different emphasis, these organizations call on Muslim for the return the Qur’an and Sunnah; support the jihad and ijtihad; and fighting against *bid’a*, *khurafat*, *taqlīd*; through various methods of da’wa, including education, preaching and publications. In Amien’s observation, all these organizations are Salafis, because they follow the path of al-Salaf.

different opinions among the companions. When the companions differed each other on one matter, Nandang asked, whom Muslim must follow.

Responding to these questions, Abdat, the first Salafi speaker, replied that what he delivered was the Salafi manhaj as a method of thought and a way of religious life, and not the matters of *fiqh* in which the Salaf had differed in a number of issues. Abdat contended that the Salaf had agreed on essential teachings of Islam. They believed in the God's punishment in the graves after the death, in the God's pre-destination, in God's occupation on His Chair (*'Arsh*), in God's Face and Hand, which are different from those of human, and in eternity (*qadīm*) of the Qur'an. Abdat argued that the Salaf did not differ on these matters. On the need of following the Salafi manhaj, Abdat argued that the Qur'an and hadith are true (*haq*). However, he continued, not all the people arguing with the Qur'anic verses and prophetic traditions are true. Again, he mentioned a number of Muslim groups, such as the Mu'tazilite, who reject some hadiths because they perceived that these hadiths contradict the Qur'an. According to Abdat, the Mu'tazila and the Muslim philosophers referred to the Qur'an and hadith to support their thought, but they interpreted them in line with their ratio, and as a result, they deviated from the true Islam. In order to avoid the same mistake, Abdat argued, following the Salaf manhaj is necessary in understanding the Qur'an and hadith. Thus, in the Salafi slogan the phrase "the return to the Qur'an and hadith" as advocated by a number of reformist Muslim organizations must be accomplished by "with understanding of the Salaf". Meanwhile, Abu Qatadah, in his reply, highlighted the characteristics of the Salaf. Referring to Yahya Abd al-Mu'in, he mentioned a number of beliefs of *ahl al-sunna*. These include the belief in the pre-destination; giving precedence to Abu Bakr and 'Umar ibn Khattab in faith and caliphate; the belief in the punishment in the grave; and the belief in the Day of Resurrection. Moreover, he mentioned a number of Salafi methods in concluding the laws (*istidlāl*). First, the return to the Qur'an and hadith; second, understanding the Qur'an and hadith in line with the Salaf manhaj; third, preferring the texts (*naṣṣ*) than ratio (*'aql*); fourth, returning the *mutashābih* texts (allegoric texts that have more than one and uncertain meanings) to the *muhkam* texts (texts that have accurate and precise meanings); and the last, reconciling the arguments when the *dalils* differ. Based on this ground, Abu Qatadah contended that each individual, group or organization must measure itself whether or not he is Salafi.

The discussion continued to the second term of question and answer session. There were four participants raising questions in this term. Almost all of them asked the validity of Salafi's arguments of the necessity of following the Salaf manhaj. They also questioned the speakers whom they must follow when the Salaf differ in a number of issues. Uus, for example, severely criticized Salafis for their insistence in following the Salaf manhaj. He argued with a widely accepted hadith telling a dialog between the

exactly the same as the Arabic text, he needed to expose his argument first in Arabic, and then followed by its translation. This method, he wanted to show that his Arabic is excellent and he was authoritative in religious affairs. In addition, during the dialog he also wore *turban*. For many people, turban symbolizes piety and certain degree of religious knowledge. Through this dialog, each party, especially Salafis, maintained their religious authority before their adherents.

It is interesting to observe the shift of religious authority in Indonesia. Traditional religious authorities (kyai and 'ulama) have been recently challenged by the newly emerging and popular *muballighs* (preacher), and *da'i* (preacher), such as Arifin Ilham and Abdullah Gymnastyar (well-known as 'Aa Gym). Supported by electronic media, particularly the national television channel, such as TV One, Metro TV, Surya Citra Television (SCTV), these young figures have attracted Muslims. This phenomenon can be observed from the participants attending the religious lessons delivered by these figures. The "Majelis Zikir" of Arifin Ilham, for example, was attended by hundreds of Muslims. The participants, mostly women, wear the white long dresses and chanted *zikr* (special formula to remember God). What is interesting of the Majelis Zikir is that many participants cry during the *pengajian*. In addition to the *zikr*, the content of the lesson delivered by Ilham is daily duties of Islam, such as prayers.⁶⁷ Another beloved preacher by women was Abdullah Gymnastyar from Bandung, West Java. He manages religious programs adopting the name of Managemen Qalbu (Heart Management). Like Arifin, Gymnastyar's sermons were attended by thousands of Muslims, mostly women. His fame significantly deteriorated after he took a second wife. This deterioration, according Hoesterey, due to the fact that Gymnastyar's authority does not stem from his deep knowledge of Islam, but from his image of an ideal husband. Before his fans, Aa Gym is represented as a good husband for his wife, and a good father for his children. Thus, when Aa Gym took the second wife, he broke his image.⁶⁸

In addition to these individual and independent preachers, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama also have faced the challenges from mass organizations, namely Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Justice Prosperity Party (PKS). As a party of da'wa, PKS, which attracts many fresh graduates of the Middle Eastern universities, often produces its religious "fatwa". In 2005, for example, PKS declared publicly that the

⁶⁷ Andree Feillard, "From Handling Water in a Glass to Coping with Ocean: Shift in Religious Authority in Indonesia", in Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J.G. Kaptein, (eds.), *Varieties of Religious Authority*, p.168.

⁶⁸ James B. Hoesterey, "Marketing Morality: The Rise, Fall and Rebranding of Aa Gym," in Greg Fealy and Sally White, *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008, pp. 95-112.

