

sentences. An independent component of semantics is identified, one central issue is the relationship between word meaning and sentence meaning. Knowing a language, especially one's native language involves knowing thousands of words. As mentioned earlier, we can call the mental store of these words a lexicon, making an overt parallel with the lists of words and meanings published as dictionaries. We can imagine the mental lexicon as a large but finite body of knowledge, part of which must be semantic. This lexicon is not completely static because we are continually learning and forgetting words. It is clear though that at any one time we hold a large amount of semantics knowledge in memory. Phrases and sentences also have meaning of course, but an important difference between word meaning on the one hand, phrase and sentence meaning on the other concerns productivity. It is always possible to create new words, but this is a relatively infrequent occurrence. On the other hand, speakers regularly create sentences that they have never used or heard before, confident that their audience will understand them. (Saeed, 2009: 38)

Yule stated Semantics is study of meaning of words, phrases and sentences (2010 : 112). On the other hand, Simmons said "A noun phrase include a noun- a person, place, or thing – and the modifiers which distinguish it" (2014:1). According to Andersen, a sentence is a complete set of words that conveys meaning (2014:1). The definition of semantics part of linguistics fields refers to the meaning words, relation

		occur in the environment of another word
	Thematic Meaning	What is communicated by the way in which the message is organized in terms of order and emphasis.

Table 3.1

Based on the table above, Leech said that “There are seven types of meanings. The first is conceptual meaning or sense. Then, connotative meaning, social meaning, affective meaning, reflected meaning, and collocative meaning include associative meaning. The last is thematic meaning.”

2.1.2 Denotative

Denotative meaning is the objective (dictionary) relationship between a word and the reality to which it refers (Crystal, 1987:418). Leech stated conceptual meaning (sometimes called denotative or cognitive meaning) is widely assumed to be the central factor in linguistic communication, and i think it can be shown to be integral to the essential functioning of language in a way that other types of meaning are not (which is not to say that conceptual meaning is the most important element of every act of linguistic communication) (2002:9).

Lyons (1977), the relationship between an expression and its extension is called denotation.

Let us see what the problems involved are by looking at a simple example.

(1) Pavarotti is an Italian singer.

Sentence is generated by combining the NP Pavarotti with the verb phrase (VP) is an Italian singer. We might say that the VP is an Italian singer has a property as its semantic value. Properties can be predicated of individuals. The result of predicating a property of an individual is something like a state of affairs or situation. So, sentence might be regarded as having a situation (or a state of affairs) as its semantic value. intuitively, one in which Pavarotti has the property of being an Italian singer. It might be possible to extend this strategy to more complex constructions. Forming an hypothesis concerning the denotation of other categories besides NPs, and in particular concerning the denotation of sentences, might help us in this task. To see this, let us take a first stab at the hard problem of such nonreferential NPs as every woman or no woman. We might try to analyze such NPs along the following lines. Let us say that these NPs indeed lack a denotation. This does not mean that they do not play any semantic role. The semantic role of, say, no woman would be that of combining with a property (such as, say, the one associated with the VP smokes) to yield a situation or state of affairs in which no woman smokes. The idea is to specify the semantic role of nonreferential NPs indirectly via the contribution that they make to the specification or description of the state of affairs associated with the sentences in which they occur. The same strategy might be applied to other nonreferential expressions

(such as and, because, etc.). Of course, to pursue this line of analysis we would have to overcome many more problems (for example, nonreferential NPs combine with expressions of many different syntactic categories, prepositions, for example, as in “ I walked with every student, “ etc.). But the above considerations do lend some preliminary support to the idea that our overall strategy of providing a referential analysis for various kinds of expressions may be viable. If so, we could have an arguably elegant account for the productivity of meaning in terms of a primitive denotation relation. Here is how we proceed. We can classify objects in various semantic categories (say, individuals, properties, situations, etc.), and we can individuate various ways of combining those objects (for example, predication combines individuals with properties to give states of affairs). Expressions of different syntactic categories would be associated with objects of different semantic categories (or types); syntactic modes of putting expressions together would correspond to ways of combining the objects that those expressions denote. In this way one could always compositionally figure out the object that any given expression denotes in terms of objects that its component expressions denote and the way in which they are put together. This also explains more precisely how configurations of symbols carry information about arbitrarily complex states of affairs. This program is thus of potential interest, for there are grounds to believe that it might account for both the aboutness of

“culture, historical period, and the experience of the individual. Although it is too simple to suggest that all speakers of a particular language speak exactly ‘the same language’, it can be assumed, as a principle without which communication through that language would not be possible, that on the whole they share the same conceptual framework, just as they share approximately the same syntax. In fact, some recent semanticists have assumed that the same basic conceptual framework is common to all languages, and is a universal property of the human mind. Thirdly, connotative meaning is indeterminate and open ended in a sense in which conceptual meaning is not. Connotative meaning is open ended in the same way as our knowledge and beliefs about the universe open ended: any characteristic of the referent, identified subjectively or objectively, may contribute to the connotative meaning of the expression which denotes it. In contrast, it is generally taken as fundamental to semantic theory that the conceptual meaning of a word or sentence can be codified in terms of a limited set of symbols (e.g. in the form of a finite set of discrete features of meaning), and that the semantic representation of a sentence can be specified by means of a finite number of rules (Leech,1983:13).

Connotation is more complicated than denotation. J. N. Hook in Widarso (1989:69) states that besides the denotative meaning, a word sometimes has the emotional overtones or we call ‘connotative’ meaning. The other important thing whenever we are talking about

